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Abstract 
This paper investigates the association between Corporate 
Governance (CG) performance and enterprise risk in 
India. The study also investigates the behavior of risk 
under different classifications. As part of this study, Risk 
is estimated through a Multifactor Estimation of VaR. 
with Cash Value Added being used as the covariate that 
represents the value of the firm. This study helps to rate 
the progress of enterprise risk governance reforms from 
the point of CG performance, plan further reforms and 
enable investors to choose the right firms. Policy makers 
will know where to focus, stakeholders will recognize 
their roles and responsibilities with respect to risk 
management and management will take informed 
operational decisions around the policies set. Major 
findings of the paper are: there exists significant risk on 
the extreme ends of the CGPI ordinal scale, CGPI 
influences CVA which in turn determines enterprise risk, 
CVA and risk analysis finds a significant role for 
industrial segments. Also the number of risk free 
companies in these extreme segments is the least. 
Manufacturing and service sectors carry maximum risk. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance Performance Index, Enterprise 
Risk, Value at Risk, Cash Value Added 
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Introduction 
Originating from Adam Smith and eventually developed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) is the concept of principal-agent conflict and 
the idea of monitoring the agent though it involves cost. The 
conflict rises with inadequate and imperfect control mechanisms 
among the involved parties leading to indiscipline and criminal 
tendencies which raise the enterprise risk that erodes the value of 
the corporation. While 1970s and 80s are dominated by US centric 
Corporate Governance (CG) studies, latter part of 90s contributions 
from other developed and developing countries and their 
experiences have enriched the literature. These studies like Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) looked at effectiveness of mechanisms to assure 
returns to the suppliers of capital thereby raising the value of the 
company for the owners. But, most of these mechanisms that are 
centered on board structure, board behavior, board responses etc. 
and its effectiveness are evaluated on financial performance 
analysis of the firm. A series of accounting scandals leading to 
value crash and subsequent bankruptcy filings (Agrawal and 
Chadha, 2004) questions the inferences made out of many 
effectiveness studies. This heightened the need for finding a way to 
assess the influence of CG performance with a reliable financial 
performance indicator which reflects value of the firm. 
High performance and profitability are obvious indicators of firm 
performance. But firms achieve performance after navigating 
through a variety of risks under categories such as financial, 
operational, market etc. If the firms end insolvent and succumb to 
credit risk, it erodes value of the firm and it gets directly attributed 
to failure of CG. Thus, CG assumes a critical role in reducing the 
probability of a crisis. It is the effectiveness of the internal controls 
that is part of CG infrastructure that acts as the Enterprise Risk 
Governance (ERG) mechanism. Therefore, value of a firm post 
managing the risk becomes a critical parameter for evaluating the 
effectiveness of CG as well. Risk exposure of the variable that 
denotes value of the firm will eventually emerge as a better 
indicator of risk. In other words, evaluating the potential downside 
loss of the indicator will identify the risk of the firm. Therefore, 
success of risk management lies in managing that potential 
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downside loss, from where firm will find additional value. 
(Damodaran 2012) 
Manifestation of any risk involves a financial loss. Excess cash a 
firm carries will assure risk mitigation as well as will fund its 
possible future expansion including inorganic growth and 
dividend payments, thus  associating itself with value of the firm. 
In other words, a firm’s excess cash holding can act as a credible 
deterrence to the enterprise risk. Under such an assumption, 
depletion in the cash reserves itself will become the ultimate risk. 
(Nocco & Stulz 2006) 
Cash holding always carries a CG connection from Jensen and 
Mekling (1986) days, when the paper argues a possible conflict of 
interest between managers and stakeholders over that. Managers 
may prefer excess cash to be within their control so that they can 
bolster their private benefits, while stakeholders would prefer to 
get it as dividends increasing their cash flow (Dyck and Zingales 
2004). In those countries where laws are inadequate to prevent 
expropriation, firms hold more cash as a larger buffer to protect 
against adverse shocks (Acemoglu, et al., 2003). CG influences 
corporate liquidity and provides stakeholders with opportunity to 
restrict agent’s discretionary spending (Isshaq et al. 2009) to assure 
stake holders of their share and ensures reasonable cash holding, 
while weaker governance results in higher conflict of interest 
(Harford et al. 2008). Therefore, liquid assets form a parameter to 
investigate the implications of agency theory and thus a key proxy 
of CG (Myers & Rajan 1998). 
This paper measures excess cash holding in terms of Cash Value 
Added (CVA) as it represents the amount of net free cash generated 
by a company through its business operations. While these 
operations are well governed, cash holding becomes a planned 
process. In other words, governance starts adding value to 
operations that results in cash (Ottosson & Weissenrieder 1996). 
CVA includes only cash items. It can be further explained as, the 
cash flow a company is able to generate over and above the cash 
flow it must generate to remain in business. That means CVA is the 
difference between company's operating cash flow (OCF) and 
Operating Cash Flow Demand (OCFD). 
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Since CVA represents excess cash holding, the enterprise risk 
estimation will involve assessing the probability of depletion in 
CVA beyond a threshold possible. Risk estimation utilizes 
adaptation of Value-at-Risk (VaR). Utilizing a multi factor risk 
model with Monte-Carlo simulation is applied for estimating VaR. 
At a prescribed confidence level, VaR is the maximum loss possible 
for a given probability or in other words, variable exceeds the VaR 
only by same probability (Hendricks 1996). Here author utilizes 
VaR to capture the downside potential loss so as to prevent a 
insolvency crisis. Else, a low probability calamity may lead to 
liquidation of the entire enterprise. In this VaR adaptation,  the 
percentage chance of losses going beyond a Financial Distress 
Threshold (FDT) is treated as the estimate of enterprise risk under 
usual conditions. Methodology utilizes essence of VaR with 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and Peaks-Over-Threshold (POT) 
method (Davison and Smith 1990) to estimate the percentage risk. 
Industry and regulatory bodies along with EU and Bank for 
International Settlements accepting VaR as the single standard 
quantification of risk, is one of the reason for its popularity 
(Marshall & Siegel, 1996). 
This study investigates the characteristics of enterprise risk 
displayed by BSE500 constituents. The study tries to understand 
the nature of variability demonstrated by risk and CVA (hereafter 
referred to as critical variables) under different categories of CGPI 
as well as at a micro-classification level such as age, size and 
industry (hereafter referred to as morphological factors) within 
CGPI categories to compare and contrast. It also tries to assess the 
nature and extent of relation existing between CGPI and risk 
undertaken. Finally, the paper examines the proportion of zero risk 
companies with respect to age and CGPI categories. 
Study utilizes CVA as risk indicator and multivariate VaR 
methodology, in estimating enterprise risk for BSE 500 constituents. 
While descriptive analysis reveals the data properties, graphical 
analysis identifies the topology of the critical variables across 
classifications and categorizations. Coefficient of correlation and its 
signs indicates the nature and strength of relations existing among 
critical variables, statistical significance of critical variables across 
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classifications and categories utilizing Tests of hypotheses 
undertaken. 
There are not many studies that associate enterprise risk and CG to 
explore causality among them in Indian context. Relative studies 
across different classifications and categorizations that enable 
characterization of the critical variables are also a rarity in Indian 
scenario. This study instead of utilizing equations built based on 
western data, completely utilizes Indian data and contemporary 
methods like VaR for estimating risk. 
VaR estimates the likelihood of loss to a financial variable at a 
certain confidence level during a defined time period. To estimate 
the potential loss, it is necessary to know the explanatory risk 
factors and their extent of correlations and their nature of influence.  
It is also necessary to define a loss threshold apart from statistical 
assumptions to define loss.  This paper utilizes, VaR with Monte-
Carlo (MC) Simulation utilizing a linear process with adaptation of 
Peaks-Over Threshold methodology. 
Risk is usually estimated with historical data. Therefore, it is more 
rearview looking than forward oriented. MC simulation provides 
us with futuristic scenarios based on assumptions, thereby giving a 
forward orientation. Success of the methodology depends on the 
comprehensiveness of the random scenarios to proxy the future. 
Even non-linear relations can be simulated with reasonable 
accuracy. (Frad & Zouari, 2014) 
Once parameters are estimated, specific distributions are chosen 
and linking functions are identified that will represent their co-
movements between outcome and the risk factors. Simulation 
process starts for the risk factors, which will eventually generate a 
distribution for the outcome variable from where VaR is estimated. 
This process is called Monte-Carlo (MC) simulation. VaR is the 
probability of making worst losses beyond a loss threshold and not 
an absolute value. (Cheung & Robert, 2012) 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) relies on a threshold to determine the 
distribution of the tail composed of values beyond that threshold. 
EVT deals with extreme deviations from median of probability 
distributions. The Peaks-Over-Threshold (POT) approach focusses 
on the extreme values beyond the high threshold set. It assesses the 
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probability of extreme events of a random variable. Thus, risk is 
determined based on left tail distribution rather than overall 
random variable distribution. (Vee et al., 2014) 
Since variables are identified after testing their significance with 
standard statistical techniques, they are more appropriate to 
describe the Indian environment and their applicability will be 
better. Independent variables in the multivariate model assume 
significance due to the causal role it carries. Hence, it carries a 
management role due to its applicability in correcting, controlling 
and constantly improving the status of the dependent variable. 
Results of this study contribute to several strands of literature 
associated with CG and risk. A better CG will allow agents to 
venture into high risk investments to assure higher value to 
stakeholders; and when there is a relaxation in CG, agents still 
venture on high risk investments with an eye on higher returns 
from equity when firm value is volatile, but market will treat such a 
firm as risky and in the long run will impact shareholder interest. 
There are strands of literature on the variables used in the 
estimation process and about the enterprise risk estimation 
methodology. Literature focuses on cash holding ability of any 
enterprise as a key determinant of the extent of risk. There are 
strands of literature on CVA which is a more up-to-date Value 
Based Measurement (VBM). As part of this paper CVA is seen as 
net pure profit that carries the potential for risk mitigation. There 
are strands of literature on estimation methodologies, but this 
paper focuses on VaR as method with a separate strand of papers 
discussing it. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 lists the 
objectives of the study. Section 3 explains the hypotheses. Section 4 
is literature survey. Section 5 discusses the data and methodology. 
Section 6 is about limitations of the study. Section 7 is the empirical 
analysis and discussion of findings. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Objectives of the study 
This study estimates the risk of BSE 500 constituents using CVA as 
the risk indicator with multifactor model for VaR estimation as the 
preliminary objective. Then, understanding the data properties of 
Sajit Jacob                  Does Corporate Governance Influence Enterprise Risk   
21 
 
the critical variables and understanding the levels of risk across 
different categories of CGPI, across different morphological factors 
such as age and size of the corporates and types of industries will 
follow as secondary objective for understanding the topology of 
risk and CVA. Developing a Multivariate linear regression for CVA 
with statistically significant micro economic factors to develop 
distribution for CVA is integral to study. As part of the objectives, 
at a macro level, nature and strength of relations among risk, CVA 
and CGPI need analysis to conclude on the influence of CG 
performance on Enterprise Risk in the process. This is followed by 
a more intensive micro analysis of Risk and CVA at CG 
performance category level by further data dissection based on 
corporate age groups, industry membership and corporate size 
groups within CGPI categories and then a statistically intensive 
analysis will be performed to further understand the extent of 
influence CG performance has on Risk through ANOVA and 
Levene’s test with Forsythe and Brown modification. Through an 
exploratory study, an analysis of proportion of zero risk companies 
across different categories becomes a subsidiary objective. Testing 
the assumptions set on critical variables about their differences 
around morphological factors as well as their significance of 
influence these factors exerts on critical variables becomes the 
ultimate objective. 
3. Hypotheses 
Ho: Average CVA across CGPI categories is equal 
It is expected that there will be shareholder activism and 
management professionalism equally acting in high market (BSE 
500C) segment. Therefore, there will always be a pressure to 
maintain and increase cash holding to fund expansions and 
manage troughs in business cycles. Hence cash in-flows will be 
competitive and differences within the high market segment can be 
insignificant as well. 
Ho: Average Risk across CGPI categories is equal 
An enterprise is exposed to risk from the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic dimensions. Macroeconomic factors act uniformly 
on the economy and therefore all companies are affected. While 
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industry specific risk is uniform for companies in that industrial 
sector, firm-specific risks differ with companies. The effects of these 
risks need not be identical, as preparedness of companies differ 
with maturity in CG system. Since population consists of only high 
performing firms in the Indian market, the assumption is that their 
evolved CG practices will devise appropriate ERG systems that will 
mitigate the risk with sufficient actions. 
Ho: Average proportion of zero risk companies across CGPI 
categories is equal 
Companies that are better governed will demonstrate better 
resilience to risk due to ERG system in place. Therefore, even if 
their risk exposure is high, their probability of succumbing to risk 
will be low. Since population considered is from the high market of 
India, the assumption of more specialized CG practices and as a 
result a more evolved risk management system that will not expose 
firms to risk will exist is the assumption. Therefore, proportion of 
zero risk companies across the categories will not be significantly 
different. 
Ho: Morphological factors has no influence on the CVA of 
companies 
High performing companies are governed based on a well-defined 
and drafted management system. A documented system keeps 
companies neutral to morphological differences like age, size, 
industry representation etc. Also a documented system keeps the 
organisation neutral of individuals, enables monitoring of 
performance of the process without bias and creates venues for 
improvement and innovation activities on the process it follows. 
Hence, a high performing firm is assumed to have sophisticated 
documented systems to handle cash flow management in place that 
will neutralize morphological differences. Therefore, CVA of 
companies will not significantly differ. 
Ho: Morphological factors has no influence on the risk profile of 
companies 
Enterprise Risk Governance is part of CG system. When an evolved 
CG system is existing to support a high performing firm; as part of 
investor activism, a well evolved system to foresee, evaluate, 
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analyse and act on the risk will be an integral part of it. A 
documented process based management system, alone can support 
the size, scale and complexity of operations BSE500 constituents 
undertake. Such a system will be independent of individual to 
create perpetual business operation. Therefore, system will support 
increasing size and age of organisation and derive improvement 
opportunities from history and will not let such factors to 
determine the nature of management to ensure higher stability and 
reliability an investor prefers to see in an organisation where they 
invest. 
Ho: Risk is influenced by CVA and CGPI of the enterprise 
Since CGPI levels determine the state of investor activism, which 
indirectly means existence of a evolved ERG system, that will 
control the risk exposure. When CVA increases, the pure cash 
profit that accumulates acts as a deterrent to risk. Therefore, while 
CGPI and CVA are positively correlated, they both are negatively 
correlated with risk is the assumption. 
4. Literature Survey 
Many of the studies in enterprise risk are in small and medium 
enterprise segment (Altman and Sabato 2007). Even with bigger 
enterprises, the ratings commercially available from specialized 
agencies are more relative and need not be absolute values of risk 
based on econometric models with foundations in firm and market 
performance parameters. Commercially available ratings do not 
indicate probability of default (Allen & Powell 2011a). 
From the time, Beaver (1966) used accounting data to predict 
bankruptcy, Ohlson (1980) using O score developed  multivariate 
discriminant analysis, Bathory (1984) created a B score using a set 
of financial ratios to assess the financial health of an organisation. 
Altman (2010), using a Z score developed with 12 independent 
variables including macro-economic variables to develop a logit 
model to predict bankruptcy. Most of these models, while they 
have many advantages due to usage of accounting ratios such as 
implementation ease, comparability of predictions across firms etc.; 
they have their share of disadvantages too. Need for building 
industry specific models (He and Kamath 2006), predicted value 
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remain static for a year as accounting information arrives annually 
(Vassalou & Xing 2004), and relies on historical performance are 
few such issues (Queen and Roll, 1987). Accuracy issues (Grice and 
Dugan 2001) and model misclassification (Gutzeit & Yozzo 2011) 
are also observed during recessions. 
Another class of models used market information to predict 
bankruptcy. Among them Merton model is prominent. Here 
default is indicated when market value of firm’s assets fall below 
total liabilities of the firm (Rikkers & Thibeault, 2007). As these 
models incorporate market information they are more forward 
looking and dynamic in nature. Due to the complexity of the 
models and its inability to carry too many variables, the 
information factored to predict default is comparatively lesser 
(Allen and Powell 2011b). 
Hillegesit et al. (2004), while comparing Merton model with 
classical models such as Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models 
finds that the former is more information rich. A comparison of 
information revealed by both classes of models was undertaken by 
Lin (2007) with a sample of healthy firms to find that the 
information content in distance to default and expected default 
frequency is very low and being attributed to absence of trading 
that leads to overestimate of time to default due to lack of volatility. 
Lin, et al..(2012) finds credit default prediction models with 
accounting variables are better performers while using annual 
accounting data of traded small and medium enterprises. 
Credit risk models which measure default probability or Value at 
Risk (VaR) attained a great deal of prominence with the proposal in 
Basel II to utilize the method to assess the capital adequacy of 
financial institutions. VaR based models provide a measurement of 
expected loss over a given time period at a given tolerance level.  
VaR can be implemented through different models such as 
covariance, parametric, and simulation models. Therefore, even 
when portfolio is same, the VaR estimate may differ with 
methodology underlying and its implementation to achieve a 
balance between accuracy and usability (Beder 1995, Hendricks 
1996). Variation in estimate may be due to the assumptions 
involved, the type and complexity of instruments in the portfolio, 
and finally the market in which it is tested (Marshall & Siegel, 
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1996). VaR estimates can vary when wrong assumptions are made 
on the distribution of the variable or if the variable demonstrates a 
time varying volatility (Sinha & Chamu 2000). Despite the adverse 
remarks, VaR summarizes an array of risks such as market risk, 
liquidity risk, operational risk etc. through a single number that 
denotes the probability of risk or even risk itself (Manganelli & 
Engel, 2001).  
Decisions of investments are influenced by the biases induced by 
the accounting process. Therefore, the inputs considered for the 
decision must be rational in nature. It must consider the discounted 
cash flow to finalize on the choice. Discounted cash flow gives the 
investor a perspective of value that they realize out of the 
investment that they have made. To measure the value, it is 
essential to segregate the strategic investments and the non-
strategic investments that enable realization of value out of 
strategic investments. Latter is considered as cost and net financial 
outcome is the value generated for the investor. (Ottosson & 
Weissenrieder 1996) Surplus value creates cash reserves for 
expansion and risk management. 
While CVA indicates the cash flow and its risk mitigating ability, 
its value add is questioned by Fernandez (2013) as computation of 
CVA relies on accounting statements that is reflecting history 
rather than the future. But, at the same time, paper agrees to the 
fact that due to the refinement of earnings with cost of capital 
makes it a business performance metric. 
Weissenrieder (1997), assumes cash flow is in equal amounts 
discounted using capital cost. But Jacobs (2003) comments that cash 
flow in equal amounts is just one of the many possible patterns 
cash flow can follow. The criticism continues, with Jacobs 
identifying OCFD as defined demand of equal amounts in every 
period, while OCF is real money at the end of a time period, 
therefore CVA is derived out of non-comparable measures. 
Moreover, OCFD is the perception of the investor or manager of 
the enterprise and it can even change from time to time, hence it 
cannot be a reference. 
Recent studies in China on SME firms using Bathory model reveals 
a negative correlation of financial risk with solvency, profitability 
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and capital structure. Study also identifies a state of no correlation 
with debt structure (Gang & Dan, 2012). Similar study in India 
reveals a negative correlation with solvency, profitability and capital 
structure, but positively related with current ratio, quick ratio, net profits 
and net assets ratio (Bhunia, 2012). 
Despite CG systems existing to check the risk management 
practices, so long as executives find stock options as an item in 
their remuneration structure, their motivation to venture into 
riskier investments will trigger a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and executives. With riskier business projects, 
earnings fluctuations will follow which leads to firm value 
volatility that makes firm riskier. Firm value volatility has a 
possibility to deteriorate firm’s market performance that acts 
detrimental to the interest of the shareholders. (Blanchard & 
Dionne 2003, Litov et al. 2007) 
Even the best of the systems can fail, since risk management is 
highly quantitative in nature, and therefore a limitation on the 
competency of the risk management team members may act as a 
constraint in evaluating thread bare all the possibilities of loss 
making. Thus, recommendations of such a team made to board will 
have lacunae which will make board decisions vulnerable to 
failure, thereby questioning the state of CG in the firm. (Healy & 
Palepu 2003, Smith & Stulz, 1985) 
Dionne and Triki (2005) identified that financial distress cost, 
information asymmetry and risk appetite of the management 
determines the effectiveness of risk management. The study also 
finds that hedge ratio is directly proportional to the distress cost. 
Higher the distress cost use of innovative instruments for hedging 
raises the risk. In countries where shareholder rights are lower, 
there are evidences to suggest manipulation of cash flow (Leuz & 
Nanda 2003) that makes firms riskier. This is a situation of weak 
CG as the intent of CG to improve the shareholder value gets 
defeated and the firm gets riskier. 
5. Data and Methodological Framework 
Secondary data from CG reports of BSE 500 constituents of the year 
2012 forms the basis of this content survey study (Beattie &Thomas, 
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2006).  For these 500 companies, CG reports available in annual 
reports are collected. For a few companies, despite the best of 
efforts to find these reports in Prowess, BSE website, internet 
searches, were not available. Data collection plan (Table 5.1) driven 
survey of published reports provides the cross sectional data of 
2012 for computing Corporate Governance Performance Index 
(CGPI) and further analyses. 
CGPI Computation: 
Every question in the data collection plan is assessed on Osgood’s 
Semantic Differential Scale. An interval scale of zero to five with 
five as the highest rating is aligned to the attributes. CGPI 
computation happens in three layers. In the first layer, scores for 
attributes are assigned, in the second layer, indices for each theme 
is computed, and in the third layer CGPI is computed. A theme 
index is computed with cumulative sum of scores for the attributes 
associated with a theme by the maximum possible score out of that 
theme, as a percentage. Simple aggregation of scores implies un-
weighted index. In the third layer, average of the theme indices 
is considered as the CGPI. (Sarkar et al., 2012) 
Based on the data distribution of CGPI, categories are identifiable. 
Boundaries of categories are statistically defined based on the 
distance in terms of standard deviations from mean of the dataset 
(Sarkar et al., 2012). Categories are from one to five with one being 
the excellent and other descriptive phrases for two to five in the 
sequence will be Matured, Optimum, Fair, and Poor. 
Firm Morphology: 
Data for corporate age (hereafter, age), market capitalization and 
industry membership for BSE 500C Index constituents are extracted 
from Capitaline database for the year 2012. Age is computed from 
the year of incorporation till 2012 in terms of years. Market 
capitalization data is downloaded as on 31/12/2012. Industry 
membership for the companies at possible granularity available in 
the database is collected and mapped to five major industries as 
in Table 3. 
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Industry wise classification of the BSE500C constituents is as 
follows: Manufacturing, Services, Mining & Refining (M&R), 
Infrastructure, and Trading. Age classification is based on the 
quartiles of the age dataset. Quartile 1 is level1 (0-22), quartile 2 is 
level 2 (23-31), quartile 3 is level 3 (32-58), and quartile 4 is level4 
(58 and above). Size (Market cap) classification also follows the 
quartile approach with first quartile is level1 (0 to 1430Cr), second 
quartile is level 2 (1431Cr to3198Cr), third quartile is level 3 (3199Cr 
to 9082Cr), and fourth quartile is level 4 (9082Cr and above). 
CVA Computation: 
CVA is computed for the entire population of BSE500C 
companies. This derived metric utilizes accounting variables as 
base measures. All the necessary accounting information is 
downloaded from Prowess Database. CVA is computed manually 
with the aid of accounting information available. CVA computation 
utilizes the formula available in Bayrakdaroglu (2012). 
 
CVA GrossCashFlow EconomicDepreciation CapitalLoad    
  (5.1) 
Where, 
GrossCashFlow EBDIT Tax       
  (5.2) 
 
 
1 1
n
WACC
EconomicDepreciation FixedAsset
WACC
 
  
   
  
  (5.3) 
% *CapitalLoad WACC InvestedCapital          (5.4) 
InvestedCapital TotalAssets CurrentLiabilities     
  (5.5) 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and Earnings before 
Depreciation Interest and Tax (EBDIT) utilizes standard formula and 
computation. 
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Econometric modelling and VaR Computation: 
Out of the financial ratios covering 15 categories such as 
liquidity, efficiency, profitability, turnover, leverage, cash flow, 
sales, income, labor, discretionary cost, foreign risk, investment, 
market value etc. that is computed, it is necessary to find the 
relative importance of different attributes with respect to the 
influence it generates on CVA. Towards achieving this goal, a sub-
set of ratios that represents the total variability in the data is 
identified with factor analysis. Factor analysis is performed on the 
financial ratio data using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
with Varimax rotation. Attributes carrying factor loading greater 
than 0.8 are considered for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Regression analysis with CVA. During this process, based on 
statistical significance of regressors identified with p-value of 
coefficients and existence of multicollinearity identified with 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), further refinement in the set of 
regressors happen.  These ratios are connected to CVA through 
OLS regression to create a multi factor risk model to estimate VaR 
in Indian context. 
0
1
n
i i i
i
CVA FinancialRatio  

      (5.6) 
Using MC Simulation based on mean and standard deviation of the 
financial ratio regressors in the multifactor model, a probability 
distribution of CVA is generated. Adapting EVA with POT 
methodology, certainty is computed based on the probability of 
achieving a lesser CVA from the median CVA already achieved 
(Fig 5.1). Thus probability of achieving lower than the median 
threshold set at 95% confidence level is identified as the enterprise 
risk associated with a company using a seven year period. 
Similarly, the procedure was replicated for all the companies in the 
population that was part of model building. 
In this study, median is chosen as the threshold not only to align 
with the EVT principles but also with Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) practices. As part of ERM, risk signals need to be sensed 
well in advance to plan the strategy of management. As part of the 
strategy, management must get enough time to react with 
mitigation, and then monitor till it reaches a more critical zone to 
Ushus JBMgt 14, 1 (2015)                                                             ISSN 0975-3311 
30 
 
initiate a contingency plan. Moreover, it was observed that most of 
the BSE500C companies carry a negative CVA as per the 
computation followed. Since all the companies are top performers 
in the market, having negative CVA need not be a hazard, but 
knowing the risk a little early and staying prepared for the 
eventuality is the norm applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.1Multi Factor Model for Estimating Risk with VaR 
6. Limitations of the study 
This study utilizes only Indian data of a short period of 
approximately ten years. Since the data is from BSE 500 top 
performing companies and it is not a complete and accurate 
representation of the corporate sector in India, applicability of the 
conclusion on entire Indian market is challengeable. As it uses 
accounting variables and adjustments applied can be different in 
different companies, the homogeneity of the data cannot be 
assured, and there is a possibility of bias. Accounting data is also 
vulnerable to manipulation; therefore, derived measures are liable 
for misinterpretation. Conditions such as normality, stationarity, 
random walk and time consistency remain assumed and it will not 
impact the ultimate results of the study. 
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7. Analysis and discussion of findings 
Multi factor model for VaR estimation 
A multi factor model for VaR estimation is created as an adaptation 
of the concept of component VaR but model here is utilized for the 
purpose of establishing correlation and causation. Finally, MC 
Simulation is conducted to generate a predicted value distribution 
for CVA so that it is future oriented. The statistically valid 
multifactor model is as follows: 
2824 17301 7.8 834 argCVA EquityMultiplierRatio TimesInterestEarned OperatingM in     
Equity Multiplier (EM) ratio, Times Interest Earned (TIE) and 
Operating Margin (OM) work as a single system of variables with 
internal pathway that will act as a negatively correlated single 
variable with CVA. Due to the high coefficient of the EM ratio, even 
a marginal dip in the ratio will have a significant negative impact. 
Also, the negative coefficients of other regressors will contribute to 
the negative movement of the overall system of regressors that will 
promote CVA growth as per the equation. A higher EM ratio 
means that more assets are funded by debt than by equity. When a 
firm's assets are primarily funded by debt, the firm is considered to 
be highly leveraged and more risky for investors and creditors. 
This also means that current investors actually own less of the 
company assets than current creditors. Companies that rely too 
heavily on debt financing will have high debt service costs and will 
have to raise more cash flows in order to pay for their operations 
and obligations. Debt service cost will impact the operating income 
(Earnings Before Interest and Tax, in short EBIT). Therefore, a 
reduced EM ratio will assure increase in EBIT which will positively 
trigger a rising TIE ratio and OM increase will be a natural outcome 
that will eventually trigger a rising CVA. Thus, this performance 
management model not only can estimate VaR but also can be used 
to manage VaR, as Risk and CVA are positively correlated as per 
the study findings that follow. 
Descriptive Statistics 
To understand the statistical properties of CVA and Risk, 
descriptive statistics is analysed (Table 7.2). Categories are created 
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based on CGPI scores. Category 1 companies are high performing 
firms with respect to CGPI and other categories from 2 to 5 are in 
ordinal ranking created with relatively lower levels of CGPI 
performance scores.  
Category 1 on the basis of CGPI based categorization scale has 
relatively a higher risk mean than the rest, while category 2 has the 
lowest risk mean. Risk means of all categories are statistically 
significant at 95% confidence level by t test. Standard errors of all 
categories except category 1 indicate means are statistically 
significant and hence they are significantly different from 
population risk mean. Median values different from mean values 
suggest skewness in the distribution. Category1 companies 
demonstrated higher relative variability in risk when compared to 
other categories due to its higher coefficient of variation. A 
negative kurtosis for categories 2 and 3 indicate a platykurtic 
distribution for all categories and a positive kurtosis for other 
categories suggest a leptokurtic distribution. All categories 
promote a negative skewness in its risk distribution. Range of all 
categories indicates uniform existence of extreme risk performance 
from risk free to cent percent risky types of firms. 
In Table 7.2 Panel B, Category 5 mean of CVA is higher than the 
rest of the categories and all means are statistically significant at 
95% confidence level by t test and as their standard errors are high, 
these means are significantly deviated from population mean. 
Widely different median value suggests distribution is significantly 
skewed. Uniform mode value of zero in all categories indicates a 
significant number of companies are there in every category that is 
on the border line of having a positive CVA. High coefficient of 
variation of CVA across all categories indicates higher variability. 
High positive kurtosis indicates a leptokurtic distribution for CVA 
in all categories. All categories are negatively skewed for CVA 
distribution. Large range values indicate existence of extreme CVA 
values in the categories.  
At the industry level comparison within categories for risk (Fig. 
7.1), category 1 has manufacturing and services at approximately 
same high risk. In category 2 and 3, services carry higher risk than 
rest. In category 4, trading firms has a higher risk. In category5, 
manufacturing, mining and refining, and services while are neck to 
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neck, there is marginal ranking among them in the same order with 
manufacturing carrying a higher risk. To generalize, except in 
category 4 and 5, in all other categories service sector carries high 
or even highest risk, then comes manufacturing as high risk sector. 
In the extreme ends of the CGPI spectrum it is manufacturing 
sector that carries the highest risk.  
Except in category 4, every other category has M&R sector 
representing the lowest CVA. Similarly, trading and services cover 
80% of categories with High CVA. Services appear with high CVA 
on both extreme ends of the category scale. Similarly M&R has the 
lowest CVA on both extreme ends of the category scale (Fig.7.2). In 
mid portion of the scale where category 3 and 4 appear, trading 
and infrastructure industries have high CVA. Overall, trading 
industry has the highest CVA arising from categories 2 and 3, in the 
same way; M&R has lowest CVA arising from categories 1 and 2 
(Fig. 7.4). 
Except in category 4, every other category has manufacturing or 
services representing the highest risk. Manufacturing appears with 
high risk only on both extreme ends of the category scale (Fig.7.1). 
In mid portion of the scale where category 2 and 3 appear, services 
industry has high risk. Overall, manufacturing, services and 
trading industries contribute to high risk through categories 1, 2 
and 4 respectively. In the same way, M&R has lowest risk arising 
from category 2. In short, 80% of categories have either 
manufacturing or services as contributor of highest risk. To 
summarize, those industries are identified as high risk industries 
(Fig. 7.3).  
A comparative analysis of average risk across categories after 
excluding risk free companies (Fig. 7.5) suggest that category 1 high 
CGPI firms have high risk, then category 2 firms have the lowest 
risk. From there to category 5 it is an ascending trend. This suggests 
that high CGPI firms, to maintain their high market performance 
are susceptible to shareholder activism, leading the management to 
riskier projects. Category 2 firms are comparatively less 
competitive as they are being treated in the top bracket. 
Maintenance of the position is the priority and hence they are not 
under undue pressure to increase market performance taking 
unreasonably risky projects while firms in categories 3 to 5 are 
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under pressure from their stakeholders to increase their market 
performance and improve their CGPI ranking, thus embarking on 
risky ventures. Hence, extreme ends of the categorization scale are 
extremely risky. 
The above described trend gets further strengthened, while 
observing the CVA trends across categories (Fig. 7.6). Categories 1 
and 5 have lowest CVA. This may be because of the amount of debt 
that is their capital structure. This will increase the interest expense 
and interest payable, which will impact the operating income and 
thus OCF will deplete leading to lower CVA. Category 3, though 
under pressure to improve performance still has highest CVA, may 
be because of the lower amount of debt that brings down interest 
payable which improves invested capital and reduces capital load 
which is the last term in CVA computation. This also may be due to 
the better management of depreciating assets that impacts the 
economic depreciation which is the middle term in the CVA 
computation. 
Relations study performed on CGPI, CVA and Risk reveals in Table 
7.2 the following facts. Except category 1, all categories associate 
CGPI and CVA on negative correlation, which means when either 
of the variable increases, the other decreases. Though the strength 
of correlation is below 50%, still its direction is significant.  
From category 3 to 5, when CGPI is decreasing CVA is increasing, 
that is leading to increase in risk eventually concluding that a 
decreasing CGPI leads to increased risk. The possible mechanics 
behind this phenomenon could be, a reduced shareholder activism 
is resulting in agents resorting to riskier projects that creates 
volatility in cash flows that eventually raises the risk. 
For category 2, when CGPI is decreasing, CVA is increasing, but 
then risk is also increasing, eventually concluding that a reducing 
CGPI leading to reducing risk. Here, a potential explanation could 
be, being a matured CGPI category, the firms in this segment will 
favor maintenance of the CG performance status quo and in the 
interest of improving valuation, acquires higher operational 
efficiency, and selection of rational projects that may lead to higher 
possible operating income. Thus CGPI decreasing leads to 
moderate CVA increase and minimal risk rise as well. Therefore, in 
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the absence of debt and risky projects, overall, the risk movement 
with respect to CGPI will be a positive correlation, which means 
when CGPI decreases, then risk also decreases.  
For category 1, when CGPI, CVA and risk are positively correlated 
with one another, possibly due to the excellent CG performance, 
there is an inherent pressure to maintain the status quo and 
improve on the same. In that process, shareholder activism presses 
injection of additional debt financing with the intention to increase 
cash flow as well to ensure control on the discretionary spending of 
the agents plus adoption of riskier projects to enhance the value. 
Thus, a potential credit risk as well as volatile cash flows out of 
risky projects increases the enterprise risk. 
Therefore, factors impacting operating income get influenced by 
the determinants of corporate governance performance. The 
negative correlation in category 5 signifies the higher risk due to a 
relaxed CG performance and as firm rises to category 1, CGPI 
improves and risk also increases as part of the corporate strategy to 
rise in value by accepting calculated risks in generating the 
operating income. Thus, there exists a strong correlation between 
CGPI and risk, suggesting an increasing risk on the either extremes 
of the category scale. This signifies the importance of the 
methodology adopted to increase the CVA may increase risk as 
well. When CGPI determines CVA and, when CVA determines 
risk, it is an associative property that we investigate in the relation 
between CGPI and risk.  
At 95% confidence level, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) studies 
reveal that by observing p>0.05, test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis, which means that, the means of the risks did not 
significantly differ with different age groups (p=0.824252) as in 
Table 7.4. Similarly, mean of the risks did not significantly differ 
with different enterprise size groups (p=0.774482) as in Table 7.6. 
But when p<0.05, test rejects the null hypothesis to mean that, the 
means of the risks did significantly differ with different industrial 
segments (p=0.016353) as in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.7 carries results of ANOVA studies on mean of CVA in 
different age groups. At 95% confidence level, p>0.05, leads to the 
interpretation that differences among the means of the CVA across 
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different age groups are statistically insignificant (p=0.0688). 
Similarly, when means of the CVAs are compared across different 
enterprise size groups, test finds that there are no significant 
differences among the means of the CVA across different age 
groups (p=0.06973) as in Table 7.9. But, when means of CVA are 
compared across industry segments, a p<0.05 leads to the 
interpretation that there is a significant difference among the CVA 
across industry segments (p=0.000978) as in Table 7.8. 
While performing Levene’s Test with Brown and Forsythe 
modification to assess the risk variances, it was observed that at 
95% confidence level, p>0.05, leading to the inference that the 
differences in the variances in risk across age groups (p=0.94395), 
industry segments (p=0.798424) and size groups (p=0.924359) are 
statistically insignificant, which means, it failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that the risk variances are equal. 
In an identical process to assess the CVA variances, it was observed 
that at 95% confidence level, p>0.05, leading to the inference that 
the differences in the variances in risk across age groups 
(p=0.6108), industry segments (p=0.110703) and size groups 
(p=0.672572) are statistically insignificant, which means, failed to 
reject the null hypothesis that the variances are equal. 
While performing an ANOVA on the proportion of risk free 
companies among different industries (p=0.07951), age groups 
(p=0.085774), and size groups (p=0.085774), at 95% confidence 
level, study failed to reject null hypothesis, which means the 
differences in the means of proportion of risk free companies across 
the different industries, age groups and size groups are statistically 
not significant.  
It is also noticed that there exists a significant difference in the 
proportion of risk free companies across CGPI categories, when 
data is segmented based on size groups as p<0.05. This leads to 
rejection of the null hypothesis which states that between CGPI 
categories, differences in proportion of risk free companies are 
statistically insignificant (p=0.049028). 
A Pareto Analysis reveals that Manufacturing and Services 
industry combined, contribute 80% of the risk free firms (Fig. 7.7). 
In terms of market capitalization, group 4 and group 3 covers 80% 
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of risk free companies (Fig. 7.8). The results were identical for 
classification based on corporate age. Cat3 and Cat2 of the CGPI 
categories covered 80% of the risk free firms (Fig.7.9). This result 
again, reiterates the fact that the firms in the either extremes of the 
CGPI ordinal scale are riskier due to varying degree of stakeholder 
activism and nature of agent intervention. 
8. Conclusion 
This study searches for a CG performance measure that is rooted in 
financial performance metric that also reflects the value of the firm. 
The risk exposure of such a variable will emerge as a better 
indicator of risk. Cash holding is a financial metric as well as it 
carries the ability to deter any credit risk that will erode the value 
of the firm. It is also a key proxy of CG significance because of its 
role in agency theory. From the stable of VBM, CVA finds its way 
into the study as it meets all the criteria for qualification. Since 
discounted cash flow is a means of estimating the value of the 
investment, a risk model on such a variable is more appropriate. 
Thus, CVA emerges as a means for estimating value and represents 
surplus cash reserves that provides means to expand and cover 
risk, thus creating value (Ottosson and Weissenrieder 1996). 
From the time of Beaver (1966) till Altman (2010), an array of risk 
prediction models arrived. Since these models employ annually 
reported accounting figures, they are lagging. Then come VaR 
based models that provide a measurement of expected loss in a 
given period of time, and can summarize an array of risks 
(Manganelli and Engel 2001). Now, enterprise risk is the downside 
risk of CVA beyond a threshold.  
A multifactor estimation model for VaR is established for CVA 
which will provide not only with a risk estimate through MC 
Simulation, but also a strategy to manage the Risk through the 
causal factors that appear as regressors. The study estimates the 
enterprise risk of BSE500 constituents. Since CVA and risk are 
critical variables in the study, their properties are analysed 
independently and jointly with CGPI. Nature and strength of 
influence of CG performance on risk is evaluated through 
correlation coefficient. At CGPI category level, risk data was 
Ushus JBMgt 14, 1 (2015)                                                             ISSN 0975-3311 
38 
 
dissected based on morphological factors of the companies, then 
using test of hypothesis for mean and variance, the significance in 
differences among means and among variances were investigated. 
In the last level of analytics, proportion of risk free companies 
across categories and morphological factors were analysed with 
test of hypothesis and Pareto Analysis. 
While CVA is statistically significant across CGPI categories and 
industrial segments, it is insignificant across age groups and size 
groups. The average CVA of category 1 and category 5 are the 
lowest when compared with rest of the categories. There exists 
companies which are on the borderline to have positive CVA in all 
categories. M&R sector consistently demonstrates low CVA while 
services and trading demonstrates a high CVA in most categories. 
Services and M&R sector demonstrates the highest and lowest CVA 
respectively in the best performing and worst performing CGPI 
categories. 
On the CGPI scale, category 5, lower performing companies 
demonstrate relatively higher mean risk. But a median analysis 
performed without risk free companies reveals that category 1 has 
the highest median risk while category 5 is marginally lower than 
category1.This brings out the significant influence of zero risk 
companies in both these categories influencing the analytics and 
inference. Statistically, the means of the risk are significant among 
the different CGPI categories and industrial segments, but 
insignificant between different age groups and size groups. While 
standard errors signify that the means of the risk are significant, 
coefficient of variation suggest variability in risk is more among 
category 1 firms. All categories carry risk free firms as well, and 
statistical analysis finds significant differences among categories 
with respect to proportion of risk free companies. More or less 
uniformly service sector registers high risk among the industry 
sectors, followed by manufacturing. In contrast, manufacturing and 
service contributes 80% of the total risk free companies.  
Category 1 companies demonstrate a positive correlation between 
CGPI score and Risk, which signifies a possible shareholder 
activism to increase the firm value by forcing agents to take risky 
means under pressure to demonstrate sustained high CG 
performance. A negative correlation that exists in category 5 
Sajit Jacob                  Does Corporate Governance Influence Enterprise Risk   
39 
 
companies signifies agents taking decisions on project financing 
and project selection completely based on their will under the 
condition of fading stakeholder influence leading to higher risk. 
Correlation inference finds support from the analysis on proportion 
of risk free companies across categories revealing category 3 and 2 
covering 80% of the risk free companies. 
The study leaves multiple areas for further examinations like role 
of debt in the capital structure of firms in the extreme ends of the 
CGPI scale; investigate role of certain industrial segments, age 
groups and size groups in influencing CVA and risk are few of 
them. This study has potential to exercise significant influence on 
policy decisions on Corporate Governance. It reiterates the strategic 
role of CG by underlining the need for bringing in corporate 
strategy and its impact within the ambit of CG. CG of a firm is 
ultimately responsible for its growth and sustenance. To achieve 
this, operational efficiency, corporate finance and economic 
intelligence functions must unite to ensure financial performance 
and related risk reduction. This convergence must be mediated by 
a corporate policy on CG. Thus CG must be all inclusive function 
that covers social and financial performance that will mitigate the 
risk and balance growth.  
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Annexures 
TABLE 5.1 
CLASSIFICATION OF DATA COLLECTION PLAN 
Data collection plan is classified into themes and within themes there 
are attributes. There are seven themes and forty attributes identified 
from CG reports in SEBI EDIFAR filing and for every theme more 
granular information is captured through a set of questions called as 
attributes.  
Sl.No Broad Themes 
No. of 
Attributes 
1 
Board of Directors (functions, training, 
shareholdings etc.) 7 
2 
Board Meetings (duration, procedure, attendance 
etc.) 4 
3 CG committees (CG, nomination, strategy etc.) 8 
4 CG initiatives (Whistle Blower Policy, CG ratings, 5 
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succession planning etc.) 
5 
Review of committees (nomination, audit, CSR 
etc.) 8 
6 
Shareholders (dividend history, changes in equity 
capital etc.) 7 
7 Awards or accolades 1 
  Total 40 
Adopted from Bhasin (2012) 
TABLE 5.2 
CATEGORIZATION OF FIRMS BASED ON CGPI 
Content survey of 471 firms out of BSE 500 index listed companies 
creates the data sheet with question level scores. Scores were 
aggregated component wise and component index is computed as a 
percentage score. CGPI is the average of the component indices. By 
looking at the CGPI distribution 
Mean value of CGPI=63.89 
Standard Deviation of CGPI=8.98 
Categories Description Classification Value 
Count 
of firms 
1 Excellent >Mean+1.5*SD (>=77) 16 
2 Matured 
Mean+0.5*SD to 
Mean+1.5*SD (69-76) 136 
3 Optimum 
Mean-0.5SD to 
Mean+0.5*SD (61-68) 168 
4 Fair 
Mean-1.5*SD to 
Mean-0.5*SD (53-60) 80 
5 Poor <=Mean-1.5*SD <=52 74 
Source: Adopted from Sarkar(2012) 
 
 
Table 5.3 
INDUSTRY CATEGORIZATION 
Capitaline database provides industry membership for the BSE 500C 
index constituents. Due to the large number of industries, to perform 
industry level analysis, more macro classification of industries is 
required. Here it is a mapping of the micro classification of industries 
available in Capitaline mapped to macro classification created by the 
author. 
Sl.No Industry (Micro classification) 
Industry (Macro 
classification) 
1 Construction, Infrastructure Infrastructure 
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2 
Automobile, Chemical, Engineering, 
Jewellery, Manufacturing, Packing, 
Paper, Pharmaceutical, Ship building, 
Textile Manufacturing 
3 Metal, Mining, Petrochemical Mining &Refining 
4 
Communication, Education, Finance, 
Food and Beverages, Health and 
Hygiene, Hospitality, Information 
Technology, Logistics, Media, Shipping, 
Telecommunication, Travel and Tourism, 
Transportation Services 
5 Retail, Trading Trading 
Source: Author 
 
TABLE 7.1 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CVA 
An Ordinary Least Squares Regression establishes a linear equation 
between CVA and multiple financial ratios as regressors. Variables for 
regression is identified maintaining the critieria on factor loading of 0.8 
and above in Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation. 
Subsequently, the significance of the regression statistics further refined 
the variables. The equation will act as the multi factor model for VaR 
estimation with Monte Carlo Simulation. The regressors and their 
formulae are as follows, EM ratio= Total assets/shareholder equity, 
TIE=EBIT/Interest Expense, OM=EBIT/Sales 
CVA = 2824 - 17301 Equity Multiplier Ratio - 7.80 Times Interest Earned- 
834 Operating margin 
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P VIF 
Constant 2824 2932 0.96 0.34 
 Equity Multiplier Ratio -17301.5 745 -23.2 0.00 1.007
Times Interest Earned -7.8046 0.2264 -34.5 0.00 1 
Operating margin -833.62 43.18 -19.3 0.00 1.007 
S = 42813.4   R-Sq = 85.2%   R-Sq(adj) = 85.1% 
Source: Author (Minitab 
Output) 
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TABLE 7.2 
Descriptive Statistics of RISK and CVA 
Enterprise risk is defined as the probability of finding lower CVA values 
beyond the historical median threshold when applied on the predicted 
CVA distribution from the multi factor model. Manually computed CVA 
values are also identically arranged and analysed. Measures of central 
tendency, measures of dispersion, data distribution properties are 
computed on the risk data clusters formed from the member firms in each 
CGPI categories. 
RISK 
Analysis 
       CAT1 CAT2 CAT3 CAT4 CAT5 
Mean 99.15 66.32 72.94 77.68 84.52 
Standard 
Error 0.82 4.39 3.64 5.01 4.07 
Median 100.00 87.19 90.14 95.72 97.40 
Mode 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Standard 
Deviation 1.82 37.26 35.07 29.19 23.00 
Sample 
Variance 3.32 1388.55 1230.02 852.31 529.15 
Kurtosis 4.97 -1.05 -0.33 0.14 3.81 
Skewness -2.23 -0.72 -1.13 -1.16 -1.87 
Range 4.11 99.95 99.96 95.53 96.80 
Minimum 95.89 0.05 0.04 4.47 3.20 
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Count 5.00 72.00 93.00 34.00 32.00 
CVA 
Analysis 
     
Mean 
-
125228.68 -92487.27 -64606.56 -108391.63 -129037.74 
Standard 
Error 64030.68 26146.16 14966.56 34628.76 34293.19 
Median -13492.50 -41511.90 -26961.67 -28859.40 -21570.36 
Mode 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SD 212365.75 256178.99 163950.49 227075.96 224875.50 
CV -1.70 -2.77 -2.54 -2.09 -1.74 
Kurtosis 4.76 60.03 58.06 14.42 3.74 
Skewness -2.18 -7.28 -7.10 -3.57 -2.11 
Range 681640.10 2299783.68 1531498.21 1227652.09 924733.55 
Minimum - - - - -924733.55 
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681640.10 2299783.68 1531498.21 1227652.09 
Maximum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Count 11.00 96.00 120.00 43.00 43.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.1 Graphical Analysis of Average Risk based on Categories 
(Industry level comparison)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.2 Graphical Analysis of Average CVA based on Categories 
(Industry level comparison)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.3 Graphical Analysis of Average Risk based on Industries 
(Industry level comparison)  
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Fig 7.4 Graphical Analysis of Average CVA based on Industries 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.5 Graphical Analysis of Average Risk across categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.6 Graphical Analysis of CVA across categories 
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TABLE 7.3 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF RISK AND CVA 
CGPI, CVA and Risk values at the firm level were collected and 
classified based on CGPI categories. Coefficient of correlation 
was computed for all combinations at Category level to assess 
the nature and strength of association existing among them. 
  CGPI Vs CVA CGPI Vs RISK CVA Vs RISK 
Cat1 0.22827 0.638803 0.538321 
Cat2 -0.14149 0.088217 0.270753 
Cat3 -0.35656 -0.47302 0.359781 
Cat4 -0.34462 -0.33799 0.574515 
Cat5 -0.42604 -0.46408 0.704015 
 
 
Table 7.4 A Comparative Analysis of Risk Among Age Groups 
Risk is the probability of finding lower CVA than the historical median 
threshold set on the predicted probability distribution of CVA. Does risk of 
enterprises significantly vary with corporate age? To ascertain the 
statistical truth, companies grouped under CGPI categories are classified 
into age groups. Average and variance of risk of all the clusters are 
computed.  Using One-Way ANOVA, average is analysed. Null hypothesis 
is Average risk of the age groups are equal and alternate hypothesis is 
average risk of the age groups are significantly different. Similarly, 
variances in risks are tested with Levene's test with Brown and Forsythe 
modification in Panel B. 
RISK-
Mean 
      Age 1 2 3 4 
  Cat1 95.89 100 100 99.93 
  Cat2 74.97 48.24 75.35 78.09 
  Cat3 70.87 77.52 68.24 75.93 
  Cat4 74.12 85.04 67.51 79.5 
  Cat5 76.36 85.24 86.65 95.81    
ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 175.8718 3 58.62393 0.300931 0.824252 3.238872 
Within 
Groups 3116.933 16 194.8083 
   
Ushus JBMgt 14, 1 (2015)                                                             ISSN 0975-3311 
50 
 
Total 3292.804 19         
RISK-SD 
      Age 1 2 3 4 
  Cat1 0 0 0 0.11 
  Cat2 32.98 37.89 37.75 32.03 
  Cat3 34.81 33.78 37.54 36.65 
  Cat4 28.13 24.21 41.21 24.65 
  Cat5 28.35 22.3 22.7 6.9    
ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 54.11572 3 18.03857 0.125571 0.943595 3.238872 
Within 
Groups 2298.43 16 143.6519 
   Total 2352.546 19         
 
Table 7.5 A Comparative Analysis of Risk Among Industry Groups 
Risk is the probability of finding lower CVA than the historical median 
threshold set on the predicted probability distribution of CVA. Does risk 
of enterprises significantly vary among industry groups?.To ascertain the 
statistical truth, companies grouped under CGPI categories are classified 
into industry wise clusters. Average risk and variance of all the clusters 
are computed and using One-Way ANOVA average is analysed. Null 
hypothesis is Average risk of the industry groups are equal and alternate 
hypothesis is average risk of the industry groups are significantly 
different. Similarly, variances are analysed with Levene's test with Brown 
and Forsythe modification in Panel B. 
RISK-
Mean 
      Industry Manuf Services M&R Infra Trading 
 Cat1 100 98.94 0 
   Cat2 63.65 73.67 39.68 72.63 44.76 
 Cat3 66.94 84.41 0 77.36 72.56 
 Cat4 85.61 75.8 0 61.2 100 
 Cat5 87.58 83.2 85.61 76.18 0   
ANOVA 
      Source 
of 
Variatio
n SS df MS F P-value F crit 
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Between 
Groups 
11428.7
7 4 
2857.19
3 4.047218 
0.01635
3 
2.92774
4 
Within 
Groups 
12707.3
6 18 
705.964
6 
   
Total 
24136.1
3 22         
RISK-SD 
      Industry Manuf Services M&R Infra Trading 
 Cat1 0 2.03 0 0 0 
 Cat2 39.17 31.4 47.27 46.23 63.04 
 Cat3 38.5 28 
 
28.21 29 
 Cat4 24.9 29.96 0 34.7 0 
 Cat5 26.64 21.81 24.93 12.96 0   
ANOVA 
      Source 
of 
Variatio
n SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 
402.311
6 4 
100.577
9 0.411252 
0.79842
4 
2.86608
1 
Within 
Groups 
4891.30
4 20 
244.565
2 
   
       
Total 
5293.61
6 24         
 
 
Table 7.6 A Comparative Analysis Risk Among Size Groups 
Risk is the probability of finding lower CVA than the historical median 
threshold set on the predicted probability distribution of CVA. Does risk of 
enterprises significantly vary among enterprise size groups?.To ascertain 
the statistical truth, companies grouped under CGPI categories are 
classified into enterprise size clusters. Average risk and variances of all the 
clusters are computed and using One-Way ANOVA, average is analysed. 
Null hypothesis is Average risk of the size groups are equal and alternate 
hypothesis is average risk of the size groups are significantly different. 
Similarly, variances are analysed with Levene's test with Brown and 
Forsythe modification in Panel B. 
RISK-
Mean 
      MrktCap 1 2 3 4 
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Cat1 95.89 100 100 99.93 
  Cat2 74.97 48.24 75.35 78.09 
  Cat3 69.4 76.02 72.36 74.07 
  Cat4 74.12 88.49 64.61 85.84 
  Cat5 76.36 85.24 86.65 95.81     
ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 222.8636 3 74.28785 0.371747 0.774482 3.238872 
Within 
Groups 3197.352 16 199.8345 
   Total 3420.215 19         
RISK-SD 
      MrktCap 1 2 3 4 
  Cat1 0 0 0 0.11 
  Cat2 32.98 37.89 37.75 32.03 
  Cat3 33.64 36.1 35.81 37.46 
  Cat4 28.13 20.22 38.59 18.25 
  Cat5 28.35 22.3 22.7 6.9     
ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS Df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 59.62738 3 19.87579 0.155883 0.924359 3.238872 
Within 
Groups 2040.073 16 127.5045 
   
       Total 2099.7 19         
 
Table 7.7 A Comparative Analysis Of CCA among Age Groups 
CVA is the excess operating cash flow generated beyond the operating 
cash flow demand, computed manually from the accounting figures. Does 
CVA of enterprises significantly vary with corporate age? To ascertain the 
statistical truth, companies grouped under CGPI categories are classified 
into age groups. Average risk and variances of all the clusters are 
computed. Using One-Way ANOVA, means are analysed. While variances 
are analysed, using Levene’s test with Brown and Forsythe Modification in 
Panel B. 
CVA-
Mean 
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Age 1 2 3 4     
Cat1 6746.25 -29268.4 -95809.3 -186498 
  Cat2 -60860.3 -46347.1 -210813 -72021.6 
  Cat3 -62090.5 -38665 -59270.3 -107198 
  Cat4 -116693 -19585.6 -133309 -188959 
  Cat5 -85814.4 -168528 -136675 -132607     
ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS Df MS F 
P-
value 
F 
crit 
Between 
Groups 24934896664 3 8311632221 2.874531 0.0688 3.24 
Within 
Groups 46263586844 16 2891474178 
   Total 71198483509 19         
CVA-SD 
      Age 1 2 3 4     
Cat1 9540.638 41391.77 135494.8 250472 
  Cat2 93324.72 36240.24 522575.9 82204.3 
  Cat3 142388 51063 81649.16 300488.9 
  Cat4 198648.9 13843.59 197953 377261.4 
  Cat5 195569.6 226004.3 267584.8 228316.5    
ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS Df MS F 
P-
value 
F 
crit 
Between 
Groups 13549570992 3 4516523664 0.622295 0.6108 3.24 
Within 
Groups 1.16126E+11 16 7257846381 
   Total 1.29675E+11 19       
 
Table 7.8 A Comparative Analysis of CCA Among Industry Groups 
CVA is the excess operating cash flow generated beyond the operating cash 
flow demand, computed manually from the accounting figures. Does CVA 
of enterprises significantly vary with industry? To ascertain the statistical 
truth, companies grouped under CGPI categories are classified into industry 
groups. Average risk and variances of all the clusters are computed. Using 
One-Way ANOVA, means are analysed. While variances are analysed, using 
Levene’s test with Brown and Forsythe Modification in Panel B. 
CVA-
Mean 
      Industry Manuf Service M&R Infra Tradin
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s g 
Cat1 -170922 
-
23201.9 -436629 
   
Cat2 -54898.9 
-
96193.7 -605506 
-
74820.6 -24648 
 
Cat3 -48767.8 -106723 -259425 
-
40740.7 
-
28699.4 
 
Cat4 -101615 -137513 
 
-
75708.7 
  
Cat5 -114938 
-
84672.1 -195100 -149458     
ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F 
P-
value F crit 
Between 
Groups 
2.78388E+ 
11 4 
695969403
22 8.29023 
0.00097
8 
3.05556
8 
Within 
Groups 
1.25926E+ 
11 15 
839505549
8 
   
Total 
4.04314E+ 
11 19         
CVA-SD 
      
Industry Manuf 
Service
s M&R Infra 
Tradin
g   
Cat1 230801.5 
33365.2
8 346497.5 0 0 
 
Cat2 63334.12 181183 1129695 
113928.
2 
34857.5
9 
 
Cat3 61116.91 
299879.
1 0 
44245.9
8 
33019.1
9 
 
Cat4 162132.4 
329094.
4 0 
75595.2
3 0 
 
Cat5 226904.4 
219632.
6 220595 
267785.
4 0   
ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F 
P-
value F crit 
Between 
Groups 
2.39577E+
11 4 
598943312
06 
2.16057
1 
0.11070
3 
2.86608
1 
Within 
Groups 
5.54431E+
11 20 
277215261
80 
   
Total 
7.94008E+
11 24         
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Table 7.9 A Comparative Analysis CCA Among Size Groups 
CVA is the excess operating cash flow generated beyond the operating cash 
flow demand, computed manually from the accounting figures. Does CVA of 
enterprises significantly vary with enterprise size?.To ascertain the statistical 
truth, companies grouped under CGPI categories are classified into sizey 
groups. Average risk and variances of all the clusters are computed. Using 
One-Way ANOVA, means are analysed. While variances are analysed, using 
Levene;s test with Brown and Forsythe Modification in Panel B. 
CVA-
Mean 
      MrktCap 1 2 3 4 
  Cat1 -6746.25 -29268.4 -95809.3 -222774 
  Cat2 -60860.3 -46347.1 -205626 -70993.3 
  Cat3 -62046.6 -43267.8 -54138.2 -111665 
  Cat4 -116693 -18688.6 -120495 -190900 
  Cat5 -85814.4 -168528 -136675 -132607     
ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 2.62E+10 3 8.72E+09 2.858954 0.06973 3.238871517 
Within 
Groups 4.88E+10 16 3.05E+09 
   Total 7.5E+10 19         
CVA-SD 
      MrktCap 1 2 3 4     
Cat1 9540.638 41391.77 135494.8 289408.9 
  Cat2 93324.72 36240.24 510561.9 83807.92 
  Cat3 149401.6 60834.61 77380.85 306102.8 
  Cat4 198648.9 14551.64 178629 400093.2 
  Cat5 195569.6 226004.3 267584.8 228316.5 
  ANOVA 
      Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 1.26E+10 3 4.19E+09 0.523066 0.672572 3.238871517 
Within 
Groups 1.28E+11 16 8.01E+09 
   Total 1.41E+11 19         
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Table 7.10 A Comparative Analysis of Proportion of Zero Risk 
Companies Among Industries 
 
Table 7.11 A Comparative Analysis of Proportion of Zero Risk 
Companies Among Age Groups 
Where do we see more risk free companies? Proportion of zero risk companies 
at industry level within CGPI category data collated and analysed with one-
way ANOVA for the hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the 
proportion of risk free companies across different industries. 
  Infra Manuf M&R Services     
Cat1 0 0.003185 0.006369 0.009554 
  Cat2 0.012739 0.038217 0.003185 0.022293 
  Cat3 0.009554 0.050955 0.003185 0.025478 
  Cat4 0.003185 0.019108 0 0.006369 
  Cat5 0.003185 0.015924 0.015924 0    
ANOVA 
      Source SS Df MS F P-value F crit 
Rows 0.000922 4 0.000231 1.625745 0.258636 3.837853 
Column
s 0.001002 2 0.000501 3.532777 0.07951 4.45897 
Error 0.001135 8 0.000142 
   Total 0.003059 14       
       
Where do we see more risk free companies? Proportion of zero risk 
companies at different enterprise age level data within CGPI categories 
collated and analysed with one-way ANOVA for the hypothesis that there is 
no significant difference in the proportion of risk free companies across 
different age groups. 
 
1 2 3 4 
  Cat1 0.003185 0.003185 0.003185 0.009554 
  Cat2 0.009554 0.006369 0.022293 0.038217 
  Cat3 0.022293 0.015924 0.015924 0.035032 
  Cat4 0.009554 0.003185 0.009554 0.006369 
  Cat5 0.003185 0.009554 0.012739 0.009554    
ANOVA 
      Source SS Df MS F P-value F crit 
Rows 0.000842 4 0.000211 3.869565 0.049028 3.837853 
Columns 0.000369 2 0.000185 3.391304 0.085774 4.45897 
Error 0.000435 8 5.44E-05 
          Total 0.001647 14     
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Table 7.12 A Comparative Analysis of Proportion of Zero Risk 
Companies Among Size Groups 
 
Where do we see more risk free companies? Proportion of zero risk 
companies at different enterprise size level data within CGPI categories 
collated and analysed with one-way ANOVA for the hypothesis that 
there is no significant difference in the proportion of risk free companies 
across different size groups. 
MktCap 1 2 3 4 
  Cat1 0.003185 0.003185 0.003185 0.009554 
  Cat2 0.009554 0.006369 0.025478 0.035032 
  Cat3 0.022293 0.015924 0.015924 0.035032 
  Cat4 0.009554 0.003185 0.009554 0.006369 
  Cat5 0.003185 0.009554 0.012739 0.009554     
ANOVA 
      Source SS Df MS F P-value F crit 
Rows 0.000842 4 0.000211 3.869565 0.049028 3.837853 
Column
s 0.000369 2 0.000185 3.391304 0.085774 4.45897 
Error 0.000435 8 5.44E-05 
   Total 0.001647 14         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fid 7.7 Industry based Pareto Analysis of Zero Risk Population 
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Fig 7.8 Market Cap based Pareto Analysis of Zero Risk Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.9 CGPI based Pareto Analysis of Zero Risk Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
